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Abstract: African countries are known to export less than any other group of countries
in the world. Numerous studies have pointed out the high level of transport costs related
to the lousy quality of transport infrastructures in the African continent to be the main
explanation of this situation. We first show that depending on the estimator used, African
countries on aggregate do not trade necessary less than the average country in the world
when it comes to gross exports, even if they underperform clearly as regards final goods
exports. We also formulate a model for trade in value-added by adapting the Anderson
and Van Wincoop’s gravity equation to take into account the structure of value-added
exports. The proposed model highlights the importance of indirect trade costs, which
are trade costs of third countries through which the exported value-added of the origin
country passes to reach its final destination. When we control for these indirect trade
costs, it appears that the penalty on the direct trade costs between African countries’ and
their partners is at least two times lower for value-added exports than what is predicted
for gross exports and even six times lower in comparison to final goods exports.
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1 Introduction
The weakness of African exports is an old but still current issue. As a matter of fact,
since the independencies, the share of this continent in world exports has never been above
8% and has declined quasi continuously despite few episodes of growth. As of today, the
African share of world exports only represents 2% according to WTO data. This low share
is a real problem for several reasons. Firstly, it has been shown that in many countries
including African, exporting firms pay higher wages and are larger than non-exporting
firms in terms of the number of employees (Bernard et al., 2007; Rankin et al., 2006). An
increase in exports is therefore potentially welfare-improving in this regard for a continent
where extreme poverty is still a pervasive issue.
Secondly, as African countries are generally small in term of economic size, an increase
in exports could, therefore, compensate for their weak domestic demand. This explains
the numerous trade agreements implemented by African countries with their regional and
international partners since the beginning of the 1990s to gain access to larger markets.
These trade agreements do not seem to have increased African countries exports what-
soever, or at least their share in world exports according to the previous stylized facts.
However, are these countries exports as weak as it appears? More formally, is there a
benchmark level that African countries exports fall short to meet?
This question has been widely discussed in the literature, and there is a consensus among
researchers that these countries trade less in comparison to others with similar charac-
teristics, despite few studies with more nuanced results.1 Limao and Venables (2001),
for example, confirm this idea. They show that there is a penalty on intra-sub-Saharan
African (SSA) trade flows and that this penalty is overturned once the level of their
transport infrastructure is accounted for. According to them, transport infrastructures,
therefore, play a key role in explaining the transport costs penalty borne by intra-SSA
trade.
Freund and Rocha (2011) reached a similar conclusion regarding the weakness of African
exports compared to the benchmark. They, however, pointed out a different trade im-
pediment even if related to transport infrastructures, notably the transit time from the
factory to the port of expedition. They found that cutting the transit time in half, that
is to say (3.5 days on average) would increase African trade by 30 per cent. The negative
role of transport infrastructures on African trade is also highlighted in Buys et al. (2006).
1Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) find that African countries do not trade less than countries with
similar economic characteristics. Rodrik (1998) explains the weakness of African exports by the low-
income growth in this continent in the period studied.
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Although interesting, some concerns can be raised regarding the results of these studies,
and this is related to the estimation methods of the theoretical model used. In fact, the
proper estimation of the gravity model, the framework on which all these findings are
founded has been widely discussed in the literature. It is, for example, acknowledged that
the use of ordinary least squares to estimate this model as commonly done by the previous
studies is not devoid of risks in the presence of heteroskedasticity, something highly likely
in trade data (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
Besides, most of the studies on African states’ trade performance use exporter and im-
porter GDPs to control for the mass variables. When bilateral gross exports are the
dependent variable and trade in intermediate goods is present, it is clear that the GDPs
are not the proper mass variables. This is because bilateral gross exports embed previ-
ously imported intermediate inputs that are used to produce the exported final goods,
while GDP is solely composed of domestic value-added. Using an improper mass variable
could alter the scores of trade performance as countries that use more imported interme-
diate inputs to produce their exported goods would be found to export more than what
their GDP allows.
Moreover, exporter fixed effects are in general, not included in the estimations. Though,
to estimate the model rigorously, exporter and importer fixed effects should be included
to adequately control for all the idiosyncratic variables as the multilateral resistance for
example. But, as the problem is to assess the trade performance of different states, it is
difficult to do so with the presence of fixed effects because they capture a share of what
we are interested in. It is thus very interesting to determine whether the alleged weakness
of African exports according to the benchmark continues to exist when the gravity model
is estimated correctly and rigorously.
To tackle the concerns mentioned above, we have a threefold approach. We firstly use
proper mass variables instead of GDP to estimate the model, secondly, we use the Pois-
son pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PPML) instead of ordinary least squares to
avoid the issues related to heteroskedasticity, and thirdly, on top of using gross exports
as dependent variable, we calculate each state value-added exports and reformulate the
gravity model in order to take into account the particularity of these trade flows before
estimating it.
Doing this represents a real improvement in the estimation of the gravity equation. This
is because it allows us to determine the real increase in international demand that a
country could expect after reducing its trade costs with its trading partners. In fact,
trade costs likely have a differential impact on value-added exports and gross exports. The
composition of gross exports that include domestic and foreign contents is the main reason.
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A trade cost could, therefore, impact the foreign content in gross exports more than the
domestic content. This is for instance suggested by Johnson and Noguera (2012b), who
showed that there had been a continuous decline of the value-added to gross exports ratio
from 1970 to 2009, concomitantly with a steep decline of trade costs during this period.
Estimating the model with value-added exports thus allows us to assess the real impact of
trade costs on this variable, and naturally eases the identification of the real contribution
a change in trade cost could make to an economy’s material well-being in terms of real
income. Some authors as Guilhoto et al. (2015) or Johnson and Noguera (2012b) using
classical gravity equations have already estimated models with bilateral value-added ex-
ports as the dependent variable. However, because of its more complex structure, these
traditional models as that of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) or other variants as
Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Chaney (2008) are not completely suitable to explain this
type of trade flows. This is because in contrast to direct bilateral exports that these mod-
els explain, a given country value-added exports to a particular destination depend on
third countries final goods exports to this destination (Koopman et al., 2014). A better
modelling strategy should, therefore, take this into account.
In this sense, Aichele and Heiland (2018) derive a structural expression for value-added
exports that they use to perform counterfactual analysis in general equilibrium, but they
do not estimate a reduced form gravity equation. Noguera (2012), proposes an approach
that combines the gross trade equation with a log-linear Taylor approximation of bilat-
eral value-added exports around a benchmark equilibrium. This gives an equation that
relates bilateral value-added exports in change to gravity variables. Although taking into
account the trade costs of third countries with the destination of final consumption, his
interesting method presents, however, the caveat to estimate a log-linear gravity equation.
In the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data as have shown Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
estimating this kind of log-linearized gravity models with ordinary least squares as it is
done by Noguera (2012) could lead to biased parameter estimates.
We propose a framework that preserves the non-linearity of the model and thus, allows
us to avoid this potential problem. Unlike Noguera (2012) who finds that the bilateral
trade cost elasticity of value-added exports is about two-thirds of that of gross exports,
we find that it is only the standard errors regarding the trade costs parameters that
are lower for value-added exports in comparison to gross trade flows. Consequently, the
heterogeneity across countries regarding the magnitude of the trade costs parameters is
lower for value-added exports.
For instance, African countries face a sizable penalty on their trade costs coefficients in
comparison to the benchmark when the dependent variable is gross exports. However,
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with value-added exports, this penalty is at least halved and even six times lower re-
spectively in comparison to gross exports and final goods exports. It thus means that
an improvement of transport infrastructures, for example, that can considerably reduce
African transport costs, could significantly increase their gross exports but have a smaller
impact on their value-added exports.
This result has many implications in terms of policies because policymakers are more
concerned about the exported value-added for the considerations detailed above. We
thus contribute to the literature by highlighting this differential impact of trade costs
on African value-added exports and gross exports, but also by proposing a model to
estimate the gravity equation for value-added exports flows appropriately. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structural gravity model of
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and discusses some considerations about its empirical
estimation. Section 3 proposes a gravity model for value-added exports and sections 4
and 5 present respectively the data and the empirical results. Finally, section 6 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 The structural Gravity Model and its estimation
Anderson and Van Wincoop’s model has the following form:
Xsj =
YsDj
Y
(
tsj
ΠsPj
)1−σ
(1)
With P 1−σj =
∑
s
Ys t
1−σ
sj
Πs
1−σ (2)
Π1−σs =
∑
j
Dj t
1−σ
sj
P 1−σj
(3)
And Ys =
N∑
j=1
Xsj (4)
And where Y is the world GDP, Ys and Dj respectively the GDP
2 and the expenditures
of countries s and j and tsj country j import costs for goods from country s. 1 − σ < 1
2The GDP mentioned is the sum of the value-added created inside a country which also includes net
taxes on intermediate inputs. See Timmer et al. (2015)
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is the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs and Πs and PJ represent respectively
the exporter and importer outward and inward multilateral resistance terms. Given its
nonlinear nature, a log-linear version of this equation is often estimated. We have:
lnXsj = a0 + a1 lnYs + a2 lnDj + (1− σ ) ln tsj − (1− σ) lnΠs − (1− σ) lnPJ + εsj (5)
Where a0 is the constant, and εsj is the error term. We use the following equation for the
trade cost factor:
Tsj = d
δ1
sj . exp(δ2contsj + δ3langsj + δ4ccolsj + δ5colsj + δ6rtasj + aibordersj) (6)
With dsj representing the bilateral distance, and contsj, langsj, ccolsj, colsj, bordersj
representing dummies respectively for the presence of a common border, a common official
language, a common colonizer, if the territory is or has been one of its partner colonies
in the past and for the country’s trade with itself. Regarding exporter and importer
multilateral trade resistances which are generally unobservable, the best way to control
for them is by using exporter and importer fixed effects (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006).
Estimating a log-linearized model is not exempted of flaws, particularly because it raises
the issue of Jensen inequality [E(ln y)6=ln E(y)] which biases the estimates in the presence
of heteroskedasticity. As Silva and Tenreyro (2006) pointed out, the expected value of
the logarithm of a random variable is a function of its mean, but also of the higher-order
moments of the distribution. So, for instance, if the error term variance in equation (5)
is a function of the independent variables as it is generally the case in trade data3, the
exogeneity assumption E(esj|x) = 0 required for the consistency of OLS will be violated.
They, therefore, advocate for using the Poisson Pseudo maximum likelihood estimator
instead, an estimation method which avoids log-linearization and has several other inter-
esting features that comply with some characteristics of trade data as the existence of
zero trade flows. The estimated model thus becomes:
Xsj = {exp( a0 + a1 lnYs + a2 lnDj + (1− σ) lnTsj − (1− σ) lnΠs − (1− σ) lnPJ) + εsj} (7)
With Xsj representing exports in value from country s to country j, the other variables
remaining unchanged. When we include importer and exporter fixed-effects to control for
3According to the authors the higher is the conditional Esperance of trade flows, the higher the variance
of trade flows with respect to the regressors probably is
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the multilateral resitance terms, we get the following empirical model :
Xsj = exp(us + lnT
1−σ
sj + uj) (8)
where uj and us are respectively estimates of the importer and exporter fixed effects, and
Y0 the income of the reference country.
Originally designed for gross trade flows, the Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) gravity
model is not necessarily suitable to analyse value-added trade flows as we will see in the
next section.
3 A gravity model for value-added exports
Trade flows between countries are generally analysed using data on bilateral gross exports.
As we know, these data are obtained by recording the gross value of goods as they cross
borders. With a fragmented production process involving many countries, inputs cross
borders many times before reaching their destination, and it is impossible to determine
where the value-added embodied in the flows exactly come from and where it is ultimately
consumed. This poses a problem when we want to explain trade flows using a standard
gravity model because the value-added to gross exports ratio is highly heterogeneous
across countries and time4. We can’t, therefore, rely on these data to properly analyse
how value-added is exchanged between countries. This has prompted the development of
new methods to obtain better measures of trade in value-added.5
If we follow Koopman et al. (2014), for example, bilateral value-added exports are func-
tions of the final goods exports of every country in the world for each bilateral relationship.
In other words, bilateral value-added exports (vij) from country “i” to country “j” are ob-
tained by summing up weighted final goods exports from every country s ∈ S in the world
to the importing country, where the weights are proportional to the importance of the
origin country “i” in the production structure of the other countries (s ∈ S). S represents
the set of countries in the world including “i”. We exploit this definition to derive a gravity
model for value-added exports, using the structural model of Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2003) as a starting point. In appendix 6.A, we derive our model by posing a problem of
maximisation under constraints, and we obtain the same results as in this section.
4See Johnson and Noguera (2012b)
5Daudin et al. (2011), Johnson and Noguera (2012a), Koopman et al. (2014)
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More formally, we have:
vij = (
S∑
s=i
piisXsj) (9)
Where Xsj is defined as in (1), piis the fraction of country “i” value-added required to
produce a unit of final goods in country s and vij bilateral value-added exports.
By combining equations (9) and (1), it follows that:
vij =
S∑
s=i
Ys Dj
Yw
(
tsj
Πs P j
)1−σ
piis
=
(
Yi Dj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ
piii
)
+
(∑S
s 6=i
Ys Dj
Yw
(
tsj
Πs P j
)1−σ
piis
)
⇒ vij=
(
Yi Dj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ
piii
) Yi DjYw
(
tij
Πi Pj
)
1−σ
piii+
∑S
s 6=i
Ys Dj
Yw
(
tsj
Πs Pj
)
1−σ
piis
Yi Dj
Yw
(
tij
Πi Pj
)
1−σ
piii


=
(
Yi Dj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ) ∑Ss=i Ys DjYw
(
tsj
Πs Pj
)
1−σ
piis
Yi Dj
Yw
(
tij
Πi Pj
)
1−σ


=
(
Yi Dj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ)( ∑S
s=i piis Ys
(
tsj
Πs
)1−σ
Yi
(
tij
Πi
)1−σ
)
⇒ vij =
(
Yi Dj
Yw
(
tij tiSj
Πi P j
)1−σ)
(10)
Where tiSj =


∑S
s=i piis Ys
(
tsj
Πs
)1−σ
Yi
(
tij
Πi
)1−σ


1
1−σ
(11)
This term tiSj is a function of bilateral trade costs between “i” and “j”, and of the weighted
sum of bilateral trade costs between “j” and all its trading partners including “i. It is also
very similar to AVW multilateral resistance, except for the fact that it is associated with
a bilateral relationship instead of being idiosyncratic to a country. It represents the
relative trade cost of the indirectly exported value-added from the origin country “i” to
the destination country “j” through third countries “s ∈ S” with respect to the directly
exported value-added from “i” to “j”. Besides, we can see that equation (10) is close to
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the Anderson and Van Wincoop’s gravity equation with the difference that it is scaled by
this new term that we label “Cost of fragmentation”.
As bilateral trade costs, this term exerts a negative effect on bilateral value-added exports.
However, it decreases with the amount of indirectly exported value-added by the origin
country, that is to say,
∂tiSj
∂piis
< 0. It means that the more connected a country is to
the world production network via its intermediate inputs’ exports, the lesser its cost of
fragmentation will be, and the higher will be its exported value-added to a given partner
comparatively to a less connected country.
Figure 1: Schematic description of bilateral value-added exports
For example, consider a 3 countries case with countries “i”, “s” and “j” as in the figure
above. The exported value-added from “i” to “j” depends on its direct exports to “j”, but
also its indirect exports through country “s” final goods exports to “j”.6 This is because
in order to produce a unit of final good, country “s” needs intermediate goods and thus
value-added from “i”. This example also clearly illustrates that the trade costs incurred by
the exported value-added from “i” to “j” are not only direct trade costs, but also indirect
trade costs incurred by the indirectly exported value-added via “s” final goods exports to
“j”.
Estimating a model of trade in value-added without taking into account these indirect
trade costs, therefore, leads to an omitted variable bias with its undesirable consequences
on the estimated coefficients. As it should be clear now, value-added exports are not com-
mon data on trade between countries easily available and should therefore be calculated.
To do so, we need an inter-country or multi-country input-output matrix. The following
section describes the data set used for this work.
6It should be recalled that Bis represents the total quantity of country “i” output required to produce
a unit of final good in country “s”, and that will be consumed either in “s” or outside “s”. BisYs therefore,
represents the fraction of country “i” output required to produce country “s” supply of final goods that
will be consumed either in “s” or outside “s”.
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4 Data
Our work is based on the GTAP 9 database7, which is a multi-country input-output table.
This table comprises 57 sectors and 140 entities within which we find 26 African countries
and 6 aggregated regions for the rest of Africa. The data set released in 2015 has 3 base
years among which we choose 2011 to conduct our analysis. We obtained our measure
of value-added exports using the methodology developed by Koopman et al. (2014). As
our table is a multi-country table, imports of intermediate consumption are not broken
down by countries of origin just as final demand imports. This poses a problem because
we need the complete set of bilateral intermediate and final demand imports in order to
calculate the bilateral value-added exports of each country. To solve this problem, two
options are possible.
Firstly, we can apply a proportionality assumption. More precisely, we assume that for a
given destination country, the imported share of intermediate goods from an origin country
is the same as the share of this country in the total imports of the destination country. This
assumption has been fairly criticised for its lack of realism.8 The second option tackles
some of these criticisms by relying on the UN Broad Economic Classification of products
by end-use category with HS6 digits level COMTRADE data to split commodities into
intermediate and final goods. Using the trade shares thereby obtained, a reconciliation
exercise is conducted to ensure that the new set of intermediate and final goods flows
be consistent with GTAP database aggregates. We use both options to get our data on
value-added exports. In order to perform the reconciliation exercise mentioned in the
second option, we follow Tsigas et al. (2012) who proposed a quadratic mathematical
programming model to do so. Appendix 6.C provides more details.
As mentioned earlier, the input-output table level of aggregation is very high. It is
problematic because of our focus on African countries. We just have 26 over 54 countries
in the continent, the 28 other countries being represented by 6 aggregated regions. This
implies that considerations regarding intra-African trade can’t be analysed convincingly
in this work. Besides, this level of aggregation forces us to make assumptions regarding
some gravity variables such as “contiguity” or “common official language”. In fact, if
one country in an aggregation of countries shares a border with another one outside of
the aggregated entity, it does not mean that all the entity shares a border with the said
external country. We, therefore, need to take this into account and we arbitrarily consider
that a given aggregation of countries shares a common border with a state if at least 80%
7This data base is available on the GTAP website.
8See for example Milberg and Winkler (2010), Puzzello (2012)
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of its component countries share a border with it.
Table 1: Presentation of the different variables used in our estimations
Variables Source Methodology/rule/formula
Value-added exports Author calculations Koopman Wang and Wei (2014)
Distance American museum of natural history Distance of an entity to itself: dii = 0.33
√
area
pi
Contiguity Cepii/Author calculations
1 if 80% of the countries of an aggregated entity
share the characteristic in the first column
with a given country, zero otherwise.
Common official language Cepii/Author calculations
Colony Cepii/Author calculations
Common colonizer Cepii/Author calculations
Regional trade agreement Mario Larch
Cost of fragmentation (tiSj) Author calculations
( ∑S
s=i piis Ys
(
tsj
Πs
)1−σ
Yi
(
tij
Πi
)1−σ
) 1
1−σ
Table 1 presents some of the variables used in our estimations, their sources and the rules
or methodology applied to get them. As we can see, we obtained the geographic distance
between each pair of countries by using a generator built by the Centre for Biodiversity
and Conservation of the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH), except for the
distance of a country to itself calculated via the formula in column 3. The proxy for
the cost of fragmentation is obtained as follows: we estimate equation (8) with the trade
costs function in equation (6) to obtain the trade costs parameters that will allow us to
get a proxy of final goods exports bilateral indexes of trade costs (tij
1−σ). The exporter
multilateral resistance Π1−σi is then obtained following Fally (2015) and finally, using
equation (11), we solve for the cost of fragmentation.
It is important to note that with this procedure, we do not get tiSj, but rather tiSj
1−σ.
This implies that the effect of the obtained term on value-added exports will not be (1−σ)
as it would have been the case if we were able to calculate tiSj directly, but unity instead
(at least theoretically). tiSj
1−σ is, therefore, more alike an inverse cost of fragmentation,
and we label it like that thereafter. The econometric results will render it more explicit;
however, before going to them, it would be interesting to make a quick description of the
data on exports in value-added and gross terms and on the cost of fragmentation.
Figure 2 presents the average data on bilateral value-added and gross exports for African
countries in comparison to the rest of the sample (ROW). It shows without surprise that
the former’s bilateral exports flows are lower in comparison to other countries be it for
value-added exports or gross exports.
When we further disentangle gross exports between intermediate and final goods exports
using either the proportionality assumption or the method based on the UN Broad Eco-
nomic Classification of products by end-use category (UN BEC method thereafter), the
result remains the same I.e. African exports flows are lower in comparison to other coun-
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Figure 2: African countries average bilateral exports (2011)
Figure 3: African countries average bilateral exports by end use (2011)
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tries as shown in chart 3. Interestingly, this figure also highlights a meaningful difference
between trade flows obtained using the two different methods.
It appears that when the proportionality assumption is used, the average final goods
export flow is higher for almost all African countries in the sample than when the UN
BEC method is used. The contrary holds when it comes to intermediate goods exports.
This suggests that the proportionality method is probably not able to replicate the true
breakdown of gross exports between final and intermediate goods and that the UN BEC
method at least captures some heterogeneity between the two kinds of flows.
Figure 4: African countries median inverse cost of fragmentation
As one could imagine, assessing African countries’ Trade performance using flows obtained
with the two methods could lead to different results. Either way, as regards the cost of
fragmentation, the difference is attested. Figure 4 presents measures for the inverse cost of
fragmentation (tiSj
1−σ) based upon flows obtained with the two methods. The chart shows
that for most African countries (72%), the median inverse cost of fragmentation is lower in
comparison to other countries when the proportionality method is used to get intermediate
goods exports and higher when the second option is used. As mentioned earlier
∂tiSj
∂piis Y s
< 0,
and therefore,
∂tiSj
1−σ
∂piis Y s
> 0 (where piisYs is the amount of value-added indirectly exported
by country “i” through third country “s”). A higher inverse cost of fragmentation, I.e.
lower cost of fragmentation, therefore, would mean that African countries export more
indirectly their value-added than the rest of the set and inversely. The analysis of the
mode by which African flows are exported in figure 5 gives ground to this assertion.
When the UN BEC method is used (the right upper panel of chart 5), African countries
featuring a lower median inverse cost of fragmentation in comparison to other countries
also export less indirectly their value-added. This is however less true when the propor-
tionality method is used (the left upper panel of chart 5), as confirm the scatter plots
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in the lower panel of the chart between the ratios of indirectly over directly exported
value-added obtained with both methods and weighted inverse costs of fragmentation9.
The slope is clearly higher for the UN BEC method in comparison to the proportionality
method, suggesting a higher correlation for the former.
Figure 5: African countries trade flows’ mode of export
5 Econometric results
This section is organized into two parts. Firstly, using the latest advances in the estimation
of gravity models, we reassess the conclusions regarding the weakness of African countries’
exports in comparison to countries with similar characteristics, then we evaluate the real
role played by trade costs in the export performance of these countries.
9The weighted inverse cost of fragmentation is obtained as following for each country:
∑
j
vij
Yi
tiSj
1−σ
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5.1 The alleged weakness of African countries exports
Numerous studies, as we said earlier, pointed out that African countries export less than
others with similar characteristics10. Most of them rely on ordinary least squares in
order to get their results. This poses a problem because as shown by Silva and Tenreyro
(2006), this estimator is not consistent if the condition of homoskedasticity is not met,
something more than likely in trade data. Besides some concerns can be raised regarding
the way key variables of the model are approximated, notably the mass variables and the
multilateral resistance terms. Since Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) at least, it is common
in the literature to control for these variables by including exporter and importer fixed
effects in the estimation. However, when the problem is to assess the trade performance
of different states, it is difficult to do so with the presence of fixed effects because they
capture a share of what we are interested in.
Most of the studies on African states trade performance, therefore, do not include them in
their estimations, and the mass variables are controlled by the exporter’s and importer’s
respective GDPs. This is a problem because a country’s gross exports include a share of
value-added from other countries, unlike its GDP. When a state is well integrated into
the world production network, for example, when the import content in its exports is
important, GDP is not a good proxy for its size. This is because the foreign share in its
exports is by definition a share of other countries GDP. As we can see, it could significantly
alter the scores of trade performance for countries with high value-added to gross exports
ratio as African countries. It is thus very interesting to determine whether the alleged
weakness of African exports in comparison to the benchmark continues to exist when the
gravity model is estimated properly.
The two following tables present the results of our estimations. The first, table 2, presents
regressions with bilateral gross exports as the dependent variable with two different esti-
mators, notably ordinary least squares (columns 1 and 2) and the Poisson pseudo max-
imum likelihood estimator (Columns 3 and 4). The four regressions also feature two
different mass variables, the log of GDP (lgdp_exporter) for columns 1 and 3 and the log
of total output (loutput) for columns 2 and 4. In each regression, we do not control for
exporters’ multilateral resistances but include importers’ fixed effects along with different
other variables to control for trade costs. By not including exporter fixed effects, we
are able to capture a penalty regarding African exports that should be higher than with
exporter fixed effects, as the latter would capture a share of what we are interested in.
Among these variables, we have bilateral distance (ldist), and dummies to control respec-
10Freund and Rocha (2011); Buys et al. (2006); Limao and Venables (2001)
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Table 2: Explanation of bilateral gross exports
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) PPML (4) PPML
VARIABLES
Log of
goods exports
Log of
goods exports
Gross exports Gross exports
lgdp_exporter 0.937*** 0.831***
(0.00454) (0.0138)
loutput 0.950*** 0.834***
(0.00438) (0.0128)
ldist -0.730*** -0.724*** -0.719*** -0.698***
(0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0335) (0.0327)
contig 0.904*** 0.901*** 0.203** 0.224***
(0.0620) (0.0598) (0.0791) (0.0814)
comlang_off 0.382*** 0.412*** 0.240*** 0.250***
(0.0294) (0.0284) (0.0773) (0.0762)
colony 0.382*** 0.372*** -0.0520 -0.0172
(0.0746) (0.0719) (0.0979) (0.0962)
comcol 0.370*** 0.387*** 0.438*** 0.451***
(0.0356) (0.0343) (0.118) (0.120)
rta 0.316*** 0.281*** 0.0987* 0.103*
(0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0597) (0.0579)
aftrade -0.530*** -0.444*** -0.168** -0.0757
(0.0198) (0.0192) (0.0835) (0.0883)
Constant 4.050*** 3.138*** 5.730*** 4.878***
(0.158) (0.153) (0.323) (0.322)
Observations 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321
R-squared 0.870 0.879
Exporter FE NO NO NO NO
Importer FE YES YES YES YES
Border effect YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
tively for the trade within a country (border effect), for the existence of a common border
(contig), a common official language (comlang_off), a colonial link (colony), a common
colonizer (comcol), or the existence of a common trade agreement (rta). We also include
a dummy that is equal to 1 for African countries’ exports and 0 otherwise (aftrade) in
order to check whether there is a penalty regarding their exports. As explained by Freund
and Rocha (2011) with this specification clearly inconsistent with trade theory because
of the absence of exporter fixed effects, the penalty regarding African exports should be
at its highest level.
As the table shows, the African dummy coefficient is negative and significant at the 1
per cent threshold for the first two columns, whose results are obtained using ordinary
least squares. Specifically, when the mass variable used is the exporter’s GDP (column
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1), African countries export approximately 41% less (e−0.53 − 1 = −0.41) than expected.
However, when the proper mass variable is used, notably total output (column 2), this
penalty decreases to 36 % (e−0.44 − 1 = −0.36). Freund and Rocha (2011) find a penalty
of a comparable magnitude when they use a similar specification as ours (See footnote 12
in their article).
The results are nevertheless different when we use the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood
estimator. In column 3 using this estimator along with the exporter’s GDP as the mass
variable, African countries export only 15% (e−0.168 − 1 = −0.15) less than expected.
However, when the proper mass variable is used, the penalty no longer exists since the
African dummy coefficient is not significant anymore. Thus, the alleged weakness of
African countries’ exports depends on the estimator used.
The question that arises is to determine which estimator we should prefer. Following Silva
and Tenreyro (2006), we perform a test to check whether the pattern of heteroskedasticity
in the data satisfies the condition required for the consistency of ordinary least squares.
This test presented in appendix 6.B shows that the OLS estimator is not suitable to
perform our estimations11. Thus, we can conclude that African countries do not export
less than expected as regards bilateral gross exports. It could be interesting to determine
whether this result holds at a more refined level where we distinguish between final and
intermediate goods.
Authors like Antràs and De Gortari (2017) have suggested that trade costs exert a more
detrimental effect on downstream stages of production than on upstream stages. As the
alleged weakness of African exports is generally explained by the higher level of trade costs
that these countries face compared to others, it will not be surprising that their trade in
intermediate goods suffers a lower penalty than their trade in final goods. The suggestive
evidence is presented in table 3, where the estimations are performed using the PPML es-
timator. This table features 4 columns, the first two representing respectively regressions
with intermediate goods and final goods exports obtained using the proportionality as-
sumption, and the two following regressions with the dependent variables obtained using
the UN BEC method mentioned above.
All these regressions follow the same econometric specification as in table 2 where we
controlled for importer fixed effects and domestic trade but did not include exporter fixed
effects. For each regression, the exporter mass variable (ltexport) is the sum of exports
11It is not necessary to perform the same test to determine whether the pattern of heteroskedasticity
corresponds to that assumed by the PPML estimator because this estimator is consistent in our case even
if the variance function is misspecified, unlike OLS. It may, however, not be efficient.
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regarding the relevant trade flows. The variable of interest is again the African trade
dummy equal to 1 for African exports and zero otherwise.
Table 3: Explanation of bilateral final and intermediate goods exports
(1) PPML (2) PPML (3) PPML (4) PPML
VARIABLES
Intermediate
goods exports
Final goods
exports
Intermediate
goods exports
Final goods
exports
ldist -0.677*** -0.699*** -0.649*** -0.798***
(0.0348) (0.0295) (0.0386) (0.0443)
contig 0.228** 0.276*** 0.234** 0.206**
(0.0918) (0.0679) (0.0956) (0.0974)
comlang_off 0.265*** 0.201*** 0.308*** 0.0800
(0.0832) (0.0665) (0.0923) (0.0870)
colony 0.0174 -0.0229 0.0408 -0.0405
(0.0987) (0.0999) (0.104) (0.133)
comcol 0.438*** 0.467*** 0.447*** 0.385**
(0.128) (0.121) (0.134) (0.175)
rta 0.109* 0.101* 0.0655 0.232***
(0.0620) (0.0515) (0.0650) (0.0801)
aftrade 0.0227 -0.221*** 0.0649 -0.730***
(0.0946) (0.0844) (0.106) (0.106)
ltexport1 0.829***
(0.0123)
ltexport2 0.828***
(0.0149)
ltexport3 0.770***
(0.0118)
ltexport4 0.990***
(0.0306)
Constant 4.821*** 4.623*** 5.377*** 3.246***
(0.343) (0.286) (0.364) (0.417)
Observations 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321
Exporter FE NO NO NO NO
Importer FE YES YES YES YES
Border effect YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As we can see, the African dummy coefficient is not significant for intermediate goods ex-
ports regardless of the way trade flows are obtained which means that as regards intermedi-
ate goods, African countries do not export less than expected. However, the story is differ-
ent for final goods exports since they export 20 % less than expected (e−0.221−1 = −0.198)
when the proportionality assumption is used, and 52% less (e−0.73−1 = −0.518) when the
UN BEC method is used. This difference in magnitude stems directly from the propor-
tionality assumption, which imposes that the trade shares be the same for final goods and
intermediate goods imports in each country. Still, as the total value of exported goods
18
is different from the total value of imported goods, we can assess the differential trade
performance between final and intermediate goods exports for African countries.
Thus, according to this econometric specification, even if it is true that on average, African
countries’ aggregate bilateral trade is no less important than expected, it appears that
when it comes to final goods, they underperform while it is not the case for intermediate
goods. It should, however, be noted that this specification intentionally designed to reveal
the highest penalty possible for African exports is not consistent with trade theory, as we
do not take into account the exporters’ multilateral resistances in our estimation.
To rigorously estimate the model, we need to control for these variables by including
exporter fixed effects in the regressions. Doing so renders difficult the assessment of
African countries’ export performance because of perfect multicollinearity between the
exporter fixed effects and the dummy for African exports. However, it is possible to check
whether there is a difference between the impact of trade costs on these countries trade
flows in comparison to others. In principle, a lower trade performance in comparison to
a reference group should be reflected by higher trade costs or a higher impact of trade
costs on trade flows.
Moreover, until now, we were interested in the export performance of African countries
regarding their gross trade flows. Though, what is relevant for policymakers is not neces-
sarily as said earlier, the growth of gross trade, as bilateral gross exports embed a share of
value-added that comes from foreign countries. These exports could, therefore, increase
because of an increase in this share of foreign value-added. Rather, value-added exports
do not embed a foreign component and are only composed of local value-added. An in-
crease in this variable thus has a direct impact on GDP growth, one of the core concerns
of policymakers. In the next series of regressions, we examine whether trade costs have a
higher impact on African countries bilateral gross exports and value-added exports.
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5.2 Trade costs and African countries’ trade performance
Many studies envisage high trade costs as one of the main explanations of Africa’s Weak
trade and economic performance.12 We assess the relevance of this assertion by performing
a series of regression based on theoretically consistent econometric specifications using the
PPML estimator. The results are reported in tables 4 and 5. More precisely, we include
exporter fixed effects along with importer fixed effects to control for exporters’ and im-
porters’ multilateral resistances as requires theory. Consequently, we can no longer assess
the trade performance of African countries by relying on the previous dummy variable
equal to 1 for African exports and zero otherwise because of perfect multicollinearity.
Table 4: Additional impact of distance on African trade flows
(1) PPML (2) PPML (3) PPML (4) PPML (5) PPML (6) PPML (7) PPML
VARIABLES
Gross
exports
Final goods
exports
Intermediate
goods exports
Value-added
exports
Final goods
exports
Intermediate
goods exports
Value-added
exports
ldist -0.689*** -0.682*** -0.692*** -0.729*** -0.695*** -0.692*** -0.711***
(0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0047) (0.0437) (0.0336) (0.0130)
contig 0.265*** 0.281*** 0.260*** 0.291*** 0.297*** 0.230*** 0.304***
(0.0699) (0.0692) (0.0713) (0.01249) (0.0949) (0.0724) (0.0350)
comlang_off 0.122* 0.126** 0.121* 0.136*** 0.249*** 0.0990 0.273***
(0.0670) (0.0613) (0.0700) (0.00968) (0.0791) (0.0738) (0.0264)
colony 0.0695 0.101 0.0525 -0.01724 0.00763 0.103 -0.00817
(0.0895) (0.0908) (0.0907) (0.0129) (0.113) (0.0904) (0.0343)
comcol 0.325** 0.363*** 0.305** 0.385*** 0.509*** 0.256* 0.548***
(0.131) (0.133) (0.134) (0.0283) (0.195) (0.140) (0.0554)
rta 0.176*** 0.190*** 0.175*** 0.203*** 0.213*** 0.198*** 0.222***
(0.0551) (0.0546) (0.0562) (0.00784) (0.0732) (0.0574) (0.0206)
lTiSj
1−σ 1.498*** 1.142***
(0.0145) (0.0169)
afldist -0.184* -0.152 -0.205* 0.039** -0.630*** -0.138 -0.0932***
(0.108) (0.117) (0.106) (0.0183) (0.128) (0.125) (0.0285)
af2ldist -0.123* -0.150* -0.109 -0.0316* -0.0836 -0.138 -0.0371
(0.0695) (0.0812) (0.0706) (0.0177) (0.0976) (0.0851) (0.0299)
Constant 19.23*** 18.20*** 18.79*** 18.17*** 18.35*** 18.77*** 18.37***
(0.318) (0.322) (0.320) (0.0469) (0.443) (0.327) (0.134)
Observations 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321
Exporter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Importer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Border effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instead, we create two interaction variables, one between the previous dummy equal to
one for African exports or zero otherwise and bilateral distance (afldist), and another
one between bilateral distance and a dummy equal to 1 for African imports and zero
12Amjadi and Yeats (1995), Limao and Venables (2001), Freund and Rocha (2011), Bosker and Gar-
retsen (2012)
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otherwise (af2ldist). Doing so allows us to avoid perfect multicollinearity, but also allows
us to determine whether the distance coefficient is significantly higher for African exports
in comparison to imports or inversely. Except for this, the trade costs function remains
the same as before as regards bilateral gross exports, including for intermediate and final
goods exports. There is a difference though regarding value-added exports. Consistently
with the model developed in section 3, a new variable that we labelled the inverse cost
of fragmentation appears. This variable, as explained earlier, captures the sum of third
countries’ trade costs through which the value-added of an origin country passes to reach
its final destination.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 present the results respectively for final goods exports, intermediate
goods exports and value-added exports obtained under the proportionality assumption.
The dependent variables in columns 5, 6 and 7 are obtained using the UN BEC method
presented in appendix 6.C. Firstly, we can see in column 4 and 7 that ltiSj
1−σ, the log of
the inverse cost of fragmentation exerts a positive and significant impact on value-added
exports. The positive sign here is due to the fact that as we said earlier, we are only able
to obtain a proxy of13 TiSj
1−σ instead of TiSj which is the real cost of fragmentation. This
is because (1 − σ), the trade elasticity is not readily observable. Had we used TiSj that
the impact would be negative and equivalent to the trade elasticity.
The second interesting result is that there is indeed a supplementary effect of distance
regarding African bilateral gross exports (afldist) and imports (af2ldist) in column 1,
although the coefficients regarding the interaction variables are only significant at the
10% threshold. It is worth to note that the additional coefficient for imports is 30 %
lower than that of exports (0.123<0.184). Intuitively, one would have expected both
penalties to be of the same magnitude since the impediments affecting exports should
symmetrically affect imports. This is not the case here, suggesting that a share of the
additional distance coefficient regarding exports captures the weak preferences of foreign
countries for African goods.
As for final and intermediate goods exports obtained with the proportionality assumption,
we can see that the trade costs coefficients are approximately the same as in column 1. It
is a consequence of this assumption which imposes that the import shares be the same for
both flows. The magnitude of the additional distance coefficients also reflects this idea.
When it comes to value-added trade flows, however (column 4), the result is different.
13To obtain TiSj
1−σ we firstly run a regression with final goods as the dependent variable using the
PPML estimator with exporter and importer fixed effects in order to get the trade costs coefficients. We
then solve for tij
1−σ using the trade costs function in equation 5 and for the multilateral resistances Π1−σi
and P 1−σj using equations 11 and 12. Finally, we solve for TiSj
1−σ using equation 21.
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It appears that in contrast to what was suggested for gross trade flows, the additional
distance coefficients for exports is positive and significant at the 5 per cent threshold
while it is 4 times lower for imports; meaning that African value-added trade flows are
less sensitive to distance than gross trade flows.
This result shares some similarities with the findings of Noguera (2012), who shows that
the trade cost elasticity for value-added exports is about two-thirds of that of gross ex-
ports. In our case, however, on average, the common distance coefficient is approximately
the same be it for value-added exports or gross exports. Only the additional distance co-
efficients regarding African countries are different for both trade flows. This is due to the
fact that the robust standard errors are lower when the dependent variable is expressed in
value-added terms, suggesting that there is less heterogeneity across countries regarding
the magnitude of the trade costs parameters.
For instance, in the case of distance, the robust standard error is equal to 0.00493 when
the dependent variable is expressed in value-added terms (column 4), while it is equal to
0.0323 for gross exports (column 1). It is interesting to note that the results still hold
when the dependent variables are obtained using the UN BEC method. We can see that
the additional distance coefficient is twice lower regarding African value-added exports in
comparison to gross exports14, and non-significant regarding value-added imports (column
7). Also, the robust standard error regarding the distance coefficient is equal to 0.013 for
the model with value-added exports, while it is equal to 0.0437 for final goods exports
(column 5).
It is moreover worth to note that when the import shares are not constrained to be the
same between final goods and intermediate goods flows, the additional distance coeffi-
cient as for African final goods exports -0.630 (column 4) is approximately 3 times higher
than that of gross exports -0.184; whereas this coefficient is non-significant for final goods
imports. In addition, as for intermediate goods, distance does not appear to play a differ-
ential impact for African trade flows in comparison to other countries. This finding seems
to confirm the result found in table 3 that African countries underperform only with their
final goods exports. It also suggests as argued earlier that a share of the additional dis-
tance coefficient regarding exports captures the preferences of foreign countries regarding
African goods.
14We should note that it is more relevant to compare final goods trade costs coefficients and value-
added trade costs coefficients because as shown in section 3, bilateral value-added exports depend on
final goods exports of origin countries and third countries, and thus on final goods trade costs. However,
as final goods exports in column 3 are obtained using the proportionality assumption, these trade costs
are approximately the same as gross exports’ trade costs. It is not the case when the proportionality
assumption is not used.
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We say so because intermediate goods are supposed to be more homogeneous than final
goods. If distance does not affect more African final goods imports nor intermediate
goods flows but only affects more final goods exports that are highly heterogeneous across
countries, it is likely that this penalty is, in fact reflecting other countries’ weak preferences
for African final goods. As the additional distance coefficient for value-added exports -
0.0932 in (column 7) is 7 times lower than that of final goods exports and 2 times lower
than that of gross exports; this could suggest that preferences are different for gross trade
flows and value-added trade flows.
The results reported in table 4 only quantify the additional impact of distance on African
trade flows. In table 5, we perform the same regressions using the full bilateral trade
costs indexes. More precisely, using equation (6), and the trade costs parameters obtained
using the previous regressions without the interaction variables between distance and the
dummies respectively for African exports (afldist) and imports (af2ldist), we calculate
the trade costs indexes tij
1−σ . We then create two new interaction variables respectively
between the dummies for African exports and imports and the trade costs indexes in order
to determine whether the impact of trade costs is higher for African trade flows than for
others.
Table 5: Additional impact of trade costs on African trade flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
Gross
exports
Final goods
exports
Intermediate
goods exports
Value-added
exports
Final goods
exports
Intermediate
goods exports
Value-added
exports
ltij
1−σ 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.997*** 1.000*** 0.992*** 1.016*** 0.997***
(0.0233) (0.0229) (0.0239) (0.00357) (0.0334) (0.0231) (0.0109)
AFlij
1−σ 0.248* 0.196 0.282** -0.0458** 0.736*** 0.133 0.114***
(0.132) (0.140) (0.131) (0.0212) (0.143) (0.177) (0.0318)
AF2ltij
1−σ 0.149 0.182* 0.126 0.0391** 0.0882 0.188 0.0481
(0.0907) (0.105) (0.0918) (0.0205) (0.116) (0.114) (0.0330)
lTiSj
1−σ 1.499*** 1.142***
(0.0145) (0.0168)
Constant 19.30*** 18.27*** 18.84*** 18.18*** 18.39*** 18.99*** 18.38***
(0.170) (0.164) (0.174) (0.0293) (0.253) (0.171) (0.0802)
Observations 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321 19,321
Exporter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Importer FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Border effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In table 5, lt1−σij is the log of bilateral costs to trade between countries “i” and “j” taken
to the power 1 − σ. AFlt1−σij is an interaction variable between the dummy for African
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exports and lt1−σij , AF2lt
1−σ
ij is an interaction variable between the dummy for African
imports and lt1−σij and ltiSj
1−σis the log of the inverse cost of fragmentation. Since 1−σ is
negative, lt1−σij is inversely proportional to the level of trade costs.
As the reported results show, the previous conclusions still hold. Trade costs exert a
higher impact on African countries gross exports in comparison to other countries. This
is because as shown in column 1, a 1% increase in trade costs would decrease African gross
exports by approximately 1−σ (0.997+0.248) %. When it comes to value-added exports,
however, it appears as in the previous table that African value-added trade flows are less
sensitive to trade costs than gross trade flows. When the proportionality assumption
is used (column 4), trade costs exert a lower impact on African value-added exports in
comparison to other countries since a 1% increase in trade costs would decrease African
flows by 1 − σ(1.001-0.0458) % only. This is a lower figure than the impact on gross
exports if we assume the trade elasticity to be the same for the two kinds of flows.
When the UN BEC method is used (column 7), the additional impact of trade costs on
value-added exports “0.114” is at least twice lower when we compare it to the impact on
gross exports and 6 times lower when we compare it to the impact on final goods exports
(column 5). More interestingly, as in the previous table, when the UN BEC method is
used, there is no additional impact of trade costs on African countries intermediate goods
exports and imports (column 6). It is also the case for their imports of final goods so that
only final goods exports are affected by an additional impact of trade costs. We observe
the same thing as regards value-added exports (Column 7) and gross exports (column 1).
As explained earlier, this fact suggests that the weakness of African exports and especially
final goods exports as established in table 3 is probably more due to weak preferences from
Non-African countries regarding the goods of our countries of interest than to the higher
trade costs faced by them. Also, value-added trade flows appear to be less impacted by
these weak preferences, which implies that the export trade performance of our countries
of interest is higher in value-added terms than in gross terms.
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper was to question the quasi consensus in the literature on the weakness
of African exports compared to what they should be. We find that the results are more
ambiguous. By applying the latest advances in the estimation of international trade flows,
we firstly showed that depending on the estimator used, African gross exports were not
as weak as said in the literature in comparison to a gravity model benchmark. More
precisely, we showed that even though they underperform clearly regarding their final
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goods exports, it is not the case as regards intermediate goods exports so that on average
their gross exports’ trade performance is similar to other countries.
We also showed that trade costs exert a higher impact on African countries trade flows,
and especially their final goods exports. However, surprisingly, when the chosen dependent
variable is not expressed in gross terms but rather in value-added terms, the additional
impact of trade costs is at least two times lower compared to their impact on gross exports
and even 6 times lower compared to their impact on final goods exports. African value-
added exports are thus less sensitive to trade costs than gross trade flows.
Finally, we observed that the additional impact of trade costs mostly concerns exports,
since it is either less important or non-existent as regards imports. This differential
impact of trade costs to us suggests that when it exists, the weakness of African exports
is probably more due to weak preferences from other countries on African goods than on
the higher level of trade costs they face compared to others as asserted in the literature.
Either way, be it weak preferences or trade costs, the trade flows that should matter
the most for policymakers, value-added exports are apparently less sensitive to these
impediments than gross trade flows. It appears, however, that countries that are well
integrated into the global value chain are likely to export more value-added than others.
It could thus be interesting to assess the interaction between trade costs and participation
in the global value chain and determine up to which extent trade costs should decrease
to foster the participation of a given region significantly.
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6.A Derivation of the value-added exports gravity model (Max-
imisation under constraints)
We have the following expression for value added-exports coming from Koopman et al.
(2014):
vij = ni(
S∑
s=i
BisXsj) (12)
Where vij represents the exported value added from the origin country “i” to the destina-
tion country “j”. This expression is obtained using input-output analysis by decomposing
a given country gross exports in terms of region of origin. As we know, to produce a unit
of exported final good, a country needs inputs from other regions in the world on top
of its own inputs. The sum of these inputs value with the value of the final good to be
exported represents gross exports, and the exported value added is, therefore, the share
of gross exports that has been created in the origin country uniquely. Said alternatively,
it represents the payments made to workers and capital owners in the origin country to
produce the exported good. In this expression, ni =
Yi
Gi
represents the GDP (Yi) to total
output (Gi) ratio, Bis is an element of the total requirement matrix derived via input
output analysis. It represents the amount of country “i” goods required to produce a unit
of final goods in country s that will be consumed either in “s” or abroad. Finally, Xsj
represents the final goods exports from country “s” to country “j”.
Equation (12) can be rewritten like this:
vij = ni(BiiXij +
S∑
s 6=i
BisXsj) (13)
By rewriting the equation like this, we show that the exported value-added from country
i to country j depends on the directly exported value-added by “i” to “j” (BiiXij), and on
the indirectly exported value-added from i, via third states “s” to country j (
∑S
s 6=iBisXsj).
This indirectly exported value added, is nothing more than the intermediate goods sourced
from “i” that are embedded, in the final good exports of third countries s, to the destination
country j.
Unlike classic exports flows, we see that value-added exports have a more complex struc-
ture, and this should be taken into account in order to build a rigorous gravity model.
If we denote by cij country j consumption of final goods (quantity) from country i, and
αis = ni Bis the amount of value-added from country “i” required to produce a unit of
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final good in country s, the utility function to be maximized by country j consumers is
thus:
(∑
i
S∑
s=i
β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(14)
Subject to the budget constraint:
∑
i
∑
s=i
αis csj psj = Yj (15)
Where psj = pstsj is the price of the exported good from country s to country j composed
of the supply price of the exporting country “ps”, and trade cost factor between the two
countries “tsj”. csj psj therefore, represents the nominal value of the exported final good
from s to j.
We solve this problem for the bilateral relationship “ij” by posing the Lagrangian:
L =
(∑
i
S∑
s=i
β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
− λ
(∑
i
∑
s=i
αis csj psj − Yj
)
(16)
∂L
∂αis csj
= 0
⇒
σ
σ − 1
(∑
i
S∑
s=i
β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
σ−1
σ
) 1
σ−1
β
1−σ
σ
s
σ − 1
σ
(αis csj)
−1
σ
− λpsj= 0 (17)
⇒

∑
i
∑S
s=i β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
σ−1
σ


1
σ−1
β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
−1
σ
psj
= λ
⇒ (αis csj)
−1
σ =
λpsj(∑
i
∑S
s=i β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
σ−1
σ
) 1
σ−1
β
1−σ
σ
s
⇒ αis csj =

 λpsj∑
i
∑S
s=i β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
σ−1
σ


1
σ−1
β
1−σ
σ
s


−σ
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We pose
(∑
i
∑S
s=i β
1−σ
σ
s (αis csj)
σ−1
σ
) 1
σ−1
= A and csj psj = xsj
⇒ αis xsj =
λ−σ
A−σ
(βs pstsj)
1−σ with pstsj = psj
We thus have:
∑S
s=i αis xsj =
λ−σ
A−σ
∑
s=i (βs pstsj)
1−σ
⇒ αis xsj =
(βs pstsj)
1−σ∑S
s=i (βs pstsj)
1−σ
(
S∑
s=i
αis xsj
)
(18)
We also have
∑
i αis xsj =
(βs pstsj)
1−σ∑S
s=i(βs pstsj)
1−σ
(∑
i
∑S
s=i αis xsj
)
=
(βs pstsj)
1−σ∑S
s=i(βs pstsj)
1−σYj
This finally gives:
αis xsj =
(
βs pstsj
Pj
)1−σ
αis∑
i αis
Yj (19)
Where Pj =
[
S∑
s=i
(βs pstsj)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
(20)
As Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) we impose market clearance to derive the gravity
equation. This implies:
Ys =
∑
i
∑
j
αis xsj (21)
Knowing that
∑
i αis equals 1, and where Ys represents the total income of country s.
We thus have:
Ys =
∑
j
(
βs pstsj
Pj
)1−σ∑
i
αis∑
i αis
Yj (22)
=
∑
j
(
βs pstsj
Pj
)1−σ
Yj
We also solve for the scaled price βsps as (AVW) which gives:
(βsps)
1−σ= Ys∑
j
(
tsj
Pj
)
1−σ
Yj
Yw
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Replacing this in equation (19), we obtain:
αis xsj =
Ys Yj
Yw
(
tsj
Πs P j
)1−σ
αis∑
i αis
(23)
Where Πs=
[∑
j
(
tsj
Pj
)1−σ
Yj
Yw
] 1
1−σ
and Pj =
[∑S
s=i
(
tsj
Πs
)1−σ
Ys
Yw
] 1
1−σ
As mentioned earlier, the bilateral exported value-added from country “i” to “j” is:
vij = (
∑S
s=i αisXsj) with αis = ni Bis and ni =
Yi
Gi
It follows that:
vij =
S∑
s=i
Ys Yj
Yw
(
tsj
Πs P j
)1−σ
αis∑
i αis
=
(
Yi Yj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ
αii
)
+
(∑S
s 6=i
Ys Yj
Yw
(
tsj
Πs P j
)1−σ
αis∑
i αis
)
⇒ vij=
(
Yi Yj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ
αii
) Yi YjYw
(
tij
Πi Pj
)
1−σ
αii+
∑S
s 6=i
Ys Yj
Yw
(
tsj
Πs Pj
)
1−σ
αis∑
i
αis
Yi Yj
Yw
(
tij
Πi Pj
)
1−σ
αii


=
(
Yi Yj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ) ∑Ss=i Ys YjYw
(
tsj
Πs Pj
)
1−σ
αis∑
i
αis
Yi Yj
Yw
(
tij
Πi Pj
)
1−σ


=
(
Yi Yj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ) ∑Ss=i βis Ys
(
tsj
Πs Pj
)
1−σ
Gi
(
tij
Πi Pj
)
1−σ


This equation is equivalent to the previous equation (10) (in the main text) and could be
rewritten like this:
=
(
Yi Yj
Gi Yw
)(∑S
s=i βis Ys
(
tsj
Πs P j
)1−σ)
or
=
(
Yi Yj
Yw
(
tij
Πi P j
)1−σ)∑S
s=i
βis Ys
Gi
(
tsj
tij
Πs
Πi
)1−σ
Recalling that
∑
i αis = 1 and αis=
Yi
Gi
Bis.
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6.B Test of the pattern of heteroskedasticity
In order to test the appropriateness of each estimator to our data, we followed Silva
and Tenreyro (2006). As each estimator assumes a specific pattern of heteroskedasticity,
their efficiency thus depends on how the variance of the dependent variable relates to its
expected value. We have the following general case suggested by Manning and Mullahy
(2001):
V [Yi|Xi] = λ0E[Yi|Xi]
λ1
If λ1 = 1, then Poisson PML is efficient. This case is a generalization of the Poisson
variance assumption that is to say equality between the conditional variance and the
conditional mean. If λ1 = 2, the Gamma PML is the optimal PML estimator. As we
know the Gamma PML first order conditions are close to the OLS (on logs) first order
conditions. The OLS estimator is also consistent in this case.
The results are presented in table 615. These tests have been conducted with conditional
variance proxies obtained from the estimations presented in table 2 columns 2 and 4 in the
main document. Specifically, we estimated for the OLS case using a non-robust covariance
estimator:
ln (Exportij − Êxportij)
2
= lnλ0 + λ1ln ̂(Exportij) + vij (24)
and for the PPML case using a robust covariance matrix estimator.
(Exportij − Êxportij)
2
= λ0Êxportij + λ0 (λ1 − 1) ln (Exportij)Êxportij + eij (25)
For the OLS case, we tested the null hypothesis λ1 = 2, and for the PPML case λ0(λ1−1)
= 0.
Table 6: Results of the test on the type of heteroskedasticity in the data (p-values)
Test (null hypothesis) OLS (table 2 column 2) PPML (Table 2 column 4)
P-value 0.0000 0.300
As we can see, this test gives credit to the adequacy of the PPML estimator to our data,
and thus reinforces the credibility of our results.
15See Silva and Tenreyro (2006) for more details on the tests
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6.C Value-added exports methodology of obtention
In this appendix, we describe the methodology used to get value-added exports data. We
begin by presenting the framework of Koopman et al. (2014) used to obtain these data and
which is based upon input-output analysis. Then, we describe the database upon which
this work is based, and finally, we present the two techniques used in order to disentangle
gross exports between final goods and intermediate goods exports, a requirement to carry
out our analysis.
6.C.1 Breakdown of gross exports by value-added from different origins
Input output analysis is a method of economic forecasting developed by Wassily Leontief,
who received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1973. This method is founded on Input-
Output Tables, which summarize the operations of sales and purchases that occurred
within an economy by sector and by buyer or seller. To carry out the analysis, some
strong assumptions are required:
• The constancy of intersectoral technical coefficients, which implies that an increase
in production necessarily leads to a proportional increase in the inputs used through-
out the production process. (No scale economies).
• Unrestricted availability of production factors
• Absence of substitutability between production factors, which implies that no matter
their price or quantity, the share of capital or labour or even intermediate inputs
remains the same in a unit of production. The production technology is therefore
the same in the period of analysis, at least for static models.
The input output table is presented as following: the sales are listed from the left to the
right in lines, and the purchases in columns.16 We therefore have in lines:
gi =
n∑
j=1
aijgj + xi (26)
Where gi represents the total production of sector i or the set of goods sold to satisfy
sector i final demand (xi ) and demand in intermediate goods (aijgj), aij the technical
coefficient which represents sector i units of intermediates goods used in the production
of sector j output. The technical coefficients constancy assumption thus means that for
any sector j, the intermediate consumption/production ratio does not vary no matter the
16See Miller and Blair (2009)
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production volume. In this framework, final demand is assumed to be exogenous since it
does not depend on total production unlike intermediate consumption.
We have in columns:
gj =
n∑
i=1
aijgj + pi (27)
Where gj represents the total production of sector j or the purchases of intermediate
consumptions (aijgj) and other production factors such as labour or capital (pi) necessary
to produce the goods. By writing equation 1 for all sectors, we get in matrix notation:
g = Ag + x Where g = (I − A)−1x = Lx (28)
With A corresponding to a (n*n) matrix of technical coefficients, I the (n*n) identity
matrix, (I − A)−1 = L the Leontief inverse, g the production of each sector and x the
corresponding final demand. As we are interested in relationships between several regions,
a simple input output framework is not suitable since it simply shows the interdependen-
cies between sectors of a single economy. We therefore need to use a different framework
which is called Inter-regional input output table (IRIO) and which allows us to identify
the interdependencies between the different regions studied and their industries. Techni-
cally, the methodology used to build it is roughly the same as the previous. For example,
in a simple 2 regions (i,j) and 1 sector case, we would have for the sales (in line) :
gi = aiigi + aijgj + xii + xij (29)
With aii representing the units of intermediates goods used in the production of one unit
of output in country i, aij country i units of intermediates goods used in the production
of one unit of output in country j, xii country i production destined for the satisfaction of
its own final demand, and xij country i production destined for the satisfaction of country
j final demand.
In matrix form we have the same expression as equation (28) which gives an IRIO model
as follows17:
[
g11 g12
g21 g22
]
=
[
I − a11 −a12
−a21 I − a22
]−1 [
x11 x12
x21 x22
]
=
[
b11 b12
b21 b22
][
x11 x12
x21 x22
]
(30)
17This part is mainly inspired from Koopman et al. (2014)
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In this matrix, the countries’ output is broken down by place of absorption. For example,
country 1 output (g1 = g11+g12) is equal to the output produced and consumed at home
(g11) and the output produced at home and consumed abroad g12 . Similarly, final demand
is broken down by place of absorption with the total final demand of country 1 (x1 =
x11 + x12) being equal to the final demand produced and consumed at home x11 and the
final demand produced at home and consumed abroad x12.
The matrix of bij is the matrix of “total requirement coefficients”18. For source country
i and destination country j, bij represents the total amount of country i gross output
required to produce an extra unit of final good in country j that can be consumed either
in j or in i. By multiplying each coefficient of this matrix with the value-added share of
gross output for the corresponding source country vi, we get a (2*2) matrix of coefficients
vibij representing the total amount of country i value-added or GDP required to produce
an extra unit of final good in country j that can be consumed either in j or in i. This
formula allows us to disentangle a given country production into value added from different
origins, either home or abroad.
Going back to equation (30), we can for example easily break down a unit of production in
destination country 1 (the first column) into its own value-added v1b11 and the value added
coming from abroad v2b21. Thus v2b21 is nothing more than the imported value-added
share in country 1 production, and given the assumption that exports and domestic sales
use the same intensity of imported output generally made in the literature, we can also
interpret this expression as the value-added import content of one unit of export. With
this framework set, we can easily break down a country’s gross exports, and therefore
explain the discrepancy between the latter and its exports of value added.
As mentioned by Koopman et al. (2014), this allows us to identify the place of each
country in the global or regional value chain.
We firstly rewrite country 1 and country 2 output as following:
g1 = [g11 + g12] = [x11 + a11g1 + (x12 + a12g2)] = [((1− a11)
−1
x11) + ((1− a11)
−1
e12] (31)
Where e12 = x12+a12g2 represents bilateral gross exports from country 1 to country 2.
g2 = [g22 + g21] = [x22 + a22g2 + (x21 + a21g1)] = [((1− a22)
−1
x22) + ((1− a22)
−1
e21] (32)
Where e21 = x21+a21g1
18See Koopman et al. (2014)
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With these expressions, we can further break down country 1 exports by source of origin.
Using v1b11 + v2b21 = 1, we therefore obtain:
e12 = (v1b11 + v2b21)(x12 + a12g2) = v1b11x12 + v1b11a12g2 + v2b21x12 + v2b21a12g2 (33)
= v1b11x12+v1b12x22 + v1b12x21 + v1b12a21g1 + v2b21x12 + v2b21a12g2
Where v1b11a12g2 = v1b12x22 ++v1b12x21 + v1b12a21g1
This equation simply means that country 1 total value of gross exports can be broken
down in terms of value added by place of origin. We therefore have four terms, with
the first representing the value added exported from country 1 to country 2 destined to
satisfy the latter country demand in final goods (v1b11x12). The second term represents the
value added exported by country 1 and which is used as intermediate goods by country
2 to produce its final goods (v1b11a12g2). This term can be further broken down into
intermediate exports that are absorbed in country 2 (v1b12x22) and intermediate exports
that are exported back to country 1 either within country 2 exports of final goods v1b12x21
or within country 2 exports of intermediate goods v1b12a21g1.
The third term (v2b21x12) represents the value added imported by country 1 and which is
embodied in its exports of final goods to country 2, and the last term represents the value
added imported by country 1 and which is embodied in its exports of intermediate goods
to country 2. On this basis, we can obtain a complete breakdown of country 1’s exports by
highlighting the terms that are doubly counted, and that explain the gap between value-
added exports and gross exports. We do this by combining the three previous equations,
which gives the following expression:
e12 = [v1b11x12 + v1b12x22] + [ v1b12x21 + v1b12a21(1− a11)
−1
x11]
+ v1b12a21(1− a11)
−1
e12 + [ + v2b21x12 + v2b21a12(1− a22)
−1
x22]
+ v2b21a12(1− a22)
−1
e21
(34)
The intuition behind this equation is very simple. The first two terms represent country
1 exports of value added. These exports include country 1 value added that is consumed
abroad as final good (v1b11x12) and its value added that is used as intermediates to
produce final goods consumed in the destination country (v1b12x22). These two terms
also correspond to Johnson and Noguera (2012a) measure of vertical specialization “Value
added exports”. They obviously form a share of country 1 GDP. This is also the case for
the following two terms in the second bracketed expression which respectively represent
country 1 intermediate exports of value added that are embodied in country 2 exports of
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final goods to country 1 (v2b21x12), and country 1 intermediate exports of value added that
are embodied in country 2 intermediates exports to country 1 and used in the production
of final goods consumed there v1b12a21(1− a11)
−1
x11.
It can be easily shown that country 1 GDP equals its value added absorbed abroad
(the first two terms), and its value added absorbed at home, namely the two following
terms that are firstly exported and finally return home as imports, plus a last term that
represents the share of GDP that is never exported. As we can imagine, the terms in
the second bracketed expression are doubly counted in trade data. This is so because
they are firstly exported by country 1 and exported back by country 2. They therefore
appear in the two country exports, and the double counting clearly come from country 2
since they form a share of country 1 GDP. The fifth term is also a doubly counted term
( v1b12a21(1− a11)
−1
e12).
According to Koopman et al. (2014), it is doubly counted twice unlike the previous. Intu-
itively, it represents country 1 value added exports of intermediates to country 2 exported
back by this country as intermediates that are used to produce country 1 exports. (They
are therefore reembodied in this country exports). If we refer to the GDP breakdown
presented above, this value does not appear in any of these countries’ GDPs. Since it
appears in both countries exports as the intuition suggests, this explains why it is doubly
counted twice. However, as it initially originates from country 1, it necessarily forms a
share of its domestic content of exports, that is to say all the value added not initially
produced abroad in its exports.
This is thus another measure of vertical specialization different from Johnson and Noguera
(2012a) “Value added exports” and which is composed of the first five terms of equation
(34). Using the same logic, we can label the last three terms “foreign content in country
1 exports”. Respectively, the sixth term and the seventh term represent the foreign value
added in its exports of final goods and the foreign value added in its exports of interme-
diates goods that are finally consumed abroad. They represent equation (34) third and
fourth term in country 2 gross exports breakdown. Finally, the eighth term share similar
characteristics with the fifth term. They are both doubly counted twice in exports data.
Precisely the eighth term in country 1 gross exports breakdown is the counterpart of the
fifth term in country 2 exports breakdown and inversely.
With this formula, we can achieve a 100 % breakdown of exports. It is however worthy
to note that the expression is slightly different when we are not in a two-country case. In
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a multi-country case with S countries and 1 sector, we have the following expression:
Ei∗ = [V i
S∑
j 6=i
BiiX ij + V i
S∑
j 6=i
BijXjj + V i
S∑
s 6=i,j
S∑
j 6=i
BisXsj ] + [V i
S∑
j 6=i
BijXji+
V i
S∑
j 6=i
BijAji(I − Aii)
−1
X ii] + V i
S∑
j 6=i
BijAji(I − Aii)
−1
Ei∗+
[
S∑
s 6=i
S∑
j 6=i
V sBsiX ij +
S∑
s 6=i
S∑
j 6=i
V sBsiAij(I − Ajj)
−1
Xjj] +
S∑
s 6=i
V sBsiAij
S∑
j 6=i
(I − Ajj)
−1
Ej∗]
(35)
With Ei∗ a S*1 vector of exports, B a S*S matrix that contains the total requirement
coefficients mentioned earlier with Bij as element, X a S*S matrix that contains the final
goods produced in exporting countries and consumed in importing countries by sectors
with X ijas element, A a S*S matrix of technical coefficients with Aij as element and V i a
1*S row vector of value-added to gross output ratios. As we can see, the new expression is
composed of nine terms rather than eight in the previous one. This is so because country
i exported value added is not composed anymore of its value added that is consumed
abroad as final good (V i
∑S
j 6=iB
iiX ij) and its value added that is used as intermediates
to produce final goods consumed in the destination countries (V i
∑S
j 6=iB
ijXjj) only, but
also by its value added that is exported to third countries and embodied in their exports
of final goods to the rest of the world (V i
∑S
s 6=i,j
∑S
j 6=iB
isXsj ).
The other terms have similar interpretations as in equation (34). The fourth and fifth
terms represent respectively the value added exported by country i and which is ex-
ported back to i by all its trading partners either embodied in final goods consumed there
(V i
∑S
j 6=iB
ijXji), or as intermediates that are used to produce goods finally consumed
there V i
∑S
j 6=iB
ijAji(I − Aii)
−1
X ii. They therefore have similar characteristics as the
third and fourth term in the previous equation. This is also true for the sixth term which
appears in many countries exports without being part of their GDP as the fifth term in
the previous equation. The last three terms of this breakdown also represent the foreign
content of country r exports, with the ninth term sharing the characteristics of the eight
term in equation (34), and the seventh and eighth terms respectively representing the
value added imported from abroad and exported back either embodied in final goods, or
as intermediate goods.
Bilateral value-added exports directly follow from the first bracketed expression in equa-
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tion (35). We have:
V ij = V iBiiX ij + V iBijXjj + V i
S∑
s 6=i,j
BisXsj (36)
=⇒ V ij =
∑S
s=i V
iB
is
Xsj
=⇒ V ij =
∑S
s=i pi
isXsj
With this framework set, we now turn to the presentation of the GTAP 9 database upon
which is based our analysis.
6.C.2 The GTAP database 9
GTAP database 9 is a multi-country input-output matrix composed of 140 regions and
57 sectors that we aggregate into one to perform our analysis. It has 3 reference years
notably 2004, 2007 and 2011, among which we choose 2011 to carry out our calculations.
The database has 40 arrays that represent different variables. The following are required
for our analysis:
TVOM: Sales of domestic products at market prices;
VIMS: Imports at market prices;
VXMD: Non margin exports at market prices;
VST: margin exports;
VTWR: margins by margin commodity;
VIFM: import purchases by firms at market prices;
VIPM: import purchases by households at market prices;
VIGM: import purchases by governments at market prices;
VDFM: domestic purchases by firms at market prices;
VDPM: domestic purchases by households at market prices;
VDGM: domestic purchases by government at market prices;
MFAREV: export tax equivalent of MFA quota premia;
XTREV: ordinary export tax;
TARIFREV: ordinary import duty;
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It is worth to note that VDFM and VIFM are composed of firms’ purchases of intermediate
goods that we denote respectively by VDFMI and VIFMI, and purchases of capital goods
that we denote respectively by VDFMCGDS and VIFMCGDS. The following identities hold
between the variables:
∑
i 6=j
V IMSij = V IFM
I
j + V IPMj + V IGMj + V IFM
CGDS
j (37)
Which means that a given country total imports of goods are either used for final consump-
tion V IPMj + V IGMj, investment V IFM
CGDS
j or intermediate consumption V IFM
I
j .
The second identity is also related to the total imports of goods at market prices.
∑
i 6=j
V IMSij =
∑
i 6=j
V XMDij +XTREVij +MFAREVij + TARIFREVij + V TWRij
(38)
It means that imports at market prices embed transportation margins V TWRij and
trade duties that are either export duties XTREVij + MFAREVij or import duties
TARIFREVij.
The third identity represents the column equilibrium condition of the input output matrix.
TV OMj = V DFM
I
j + V IFM
I
j + V DPMj + V DGMj + V IGMj + V IPMj+
V DFMCGDSj + V IFM
CGDS
j + V STj +
∑
i 6=j
V XMDji − V IMSij
(39)
Where the GDP at market prices of country j is represented by V DPMj + V DGMj +
V IGMj + V IPMj + V DFM
CGDS
j + V IFM
CGDS
j +
∑
i V XMDji− V IMSij + V STj and
V DFM Ij + V IFM
I
j is it’s consumption of domestic and intermediate inputs including
custom duties and transport margins. The row equilibrium is as following:
TV OMi = V DFM
I
i + V DPMi + V DGMi + V DFM
CGDS
i + V STi +
∑
j
V XMDij (40)
The following table presents a simplified view of the GTAP database structure. We can see
that the database does not give information regarding the end use of exports V XMDAM ,
or regarding the different source countries of intermediate goods imports V IFM IA.
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Table 7: A simplified view of the GTAP data base structure.
Intermediate use Final Demand
Rest of world (M) Gross,output
Country A Rest of world (M) Country A Rest of world (M)
Country A V DFM IA
V DPMA
+V DGMA
+V DFMCGDSA
V XMDAM+V STA TV OMA
Rest of World (M) V IFM IA
Value-added
V DPMA + V DGMA
+V IGMA + V IPMA
+V DFMCGDSA
+V IFMCGDSA + V STA
+V XMDAM − V IMSMA
Gross output TV OMA
As we saw e, we need a complete set of bilateral intermediate goods exports and final
goods exports to obtain our data on value-added exports. To solve this problem, we
either use a proportionality assumption or a reconciliation technique that relies on the
UN BEC classification of goods by end use categories and detailed trade data at the 6
digits level from UN COMTRADE database.
6.C.3 Disentangling of trade flows by end use
a. The proportionality assumption
Applying the proportionality assumption amounts to assume that the imports of
intermediate and final goods of a given country from a particular source are pro-
portional to its total imports from this source. More specifically, we apply this
assumption by firstly determining the share Sintjof intermediate goods in the total
amount of goods imported by a given country using the following formula:
V IFM Ij
V IMSj
= Sintj (41)
Then, we apply this share to bilateral exports from other countries to this given
country V XMDij so as to get bilateral exports of intermediate goods that we label
V XMDIij.
V XMDIij = Sintj ∗ V XMDij (42)
Bilateral exports of final goods V XMDFij . are then obtained by calculating the dif-
ference between bilateral exports of intermediate goods and total bilateral exports.
V XMDFij = V XMDij − V XMD
I
ij (43)
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These bilateral exports of intermediate goods are net of custom duties and trans-
portation margins. We apply the same share of intermediate goods as before Sint to
the total amount of custom duties so as to determine the amount that is related to
intermediate goods. As regards transportation margins, we determine the bilateral
supply of transport services by firstly calculating the share SV ST i of each country
in the world total supply of transport services (VST), then, we apply these shares
to the total demand of transport services for each country V TWRj in order to get
our variable of interest. Finally, we use the share of intermediate goods Sintj to ob-
tain the bilateral supply of transport services regarding intermediate goods. When
properly done, the following identities should hold:
V IFM Ij =
∑
i V XMD
I
ij + Sintj ∗ [(XTREVij +MFAREVij + TARIFREVij) + SV ST i ∗ (V TWRj)] (44)
∑
i
V XMDFij +
(
1− Sintj
)
∗ [(XTREVij +MFAREVij + TARIFREVij) + SV ST i ∗ (V TWRj)]
= V IPMj + V IGMj + V IFM
CGDS
j
(45)
A simplified view of the resulting inter country input output matrix for a two-
country case is presented in table 8. Although using the proportionality assumption
allows us to disentangle bilateral gross exports into intermediate and final goods
exports. It should be noted that this assumption is too restrictive. Some countries
are located in the downstream of the production process while other are upstream,
which means that the former export relatively more final goods than the latter. The
proportionality assumption does not allow us to capture this phenomenon. It could
therefore be interesting to obtain the share of intermediate and final goods in each
country bilateral exports by relying upon existing classifications of goods by end
use.
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Table 8: A simplified view of the inter country input output matrix
Intermediate use Final Demand
Gross output
Country A Country B Country A Country B
Country A V DFM IA V XMD
I
AB + [SV STA ∗ (V TWRB) ∗ SintB] V DFM
CGDS
A
V XMDFAB
+ [SV STA ∗ (V TWRB) ∗ (1− SintB)]
TV OMA
Country B V XMDIBA + [SV STB ∗ (V TWRA) ∗ SintA] V DFM
I
B
V XMDFBA
+ [SV STB ∗ (V TWRA) ∗ (1− SintB)]
V DFMCGDSB TV OMB
Custom duties and taxes
SintA
∗ (XTREVA +MFAREVA + TARIFREVA)
SintB
∗ (XTREVB +MFAREVB + TARIFREVB)
Value-added
V DPMA + V DGMA
+V IGMA + V IPMA
+V DFMCGDSA + V IFM
CGDS
A
+V XMDA − V IMSA + V STA
V DPMB + V DGMB
+V IGMB + V IPMB
+V DFMCGDSB + V IFM
CGDS
B
+V XMDB − V IMSB + V STB
Gross output TV OMA TV OMB
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b. The UN BEC method
Instead of relying upon ad-hoc assumptions, we use the UN BEC classification of products
by end-use category along with the UN COMTRADE database which reports bilateral
exports and imports of goods between countries at the HS 6 digits level, in order to obtain
the share of intermediate and final goods in the exports of a given country to a particular
destination. As regards trade in services, we use data from Francois and Pindyuk (2013)
that follow the EBOPS 2002 classification. To distinguish goods and services by their end
use category, we use tables of correspondence between the UN BEC revision 4 classification
and the HS 2002 classification for goods and the UN BEC revision 5 with the EBOPS
classification for services.
These tables of correspondence are available on the UN trade statistics website for the
HS/BEC correspondence while for the HS/EBOPS correspondence, we rely on a draft
document from the same source that propose a correlation table between the UN BEC
revision 5 and the EBOPS classification19. We use UN BEC revision 5 rather than re-
vision 4 for trade in services because it does a better job than revision 4 at identifying
services. In order to relate these trade flows with the GTAP database, we also use ta-
bles of correspondence between the HS 2002 classification, the EBOPS 2002 classification
and GTAP sectors. The correspondence tables come respectively from the UN and the
European commission websites20.
At the end of this process, we get goods and services identified by their GTAP sector and
their end-use category, be it final consumption, intermediate consumption or both. Some
goods and services are therefore used both for final or intermediate consumption, and we
need to assign to these goods a unique end-use category to carry-out our analysis. To do
so, we use the GTAP database as a benchmark. More precisely, we firstly determine the
ratio of intermediate imports over total imports by sector in the GTAP database and with
our collected data. Then, we use an allocation method that leads to the convergence of the
two ratios. Specifically, if for a given sector the ratio that we get with our collected data
is superior to the ratio in the GTAP database, we consider that all the flows remaining
which do not have a unique end-use are final goods. If the ratio is inferior, the dual-use
items are used as a mean of adjustment to converge to the GTAP database ratio.
These dual-use items represent 10% of the database collected from COMTRADE and
Francois et al for the year 2011, which is our year of analysis, and 7% for African countries.
19We provide this table of correlation in the online appendix
20We provide the table of correspondence between GTAP sectors and the EBOPS classification in the
online appendix.
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Besides, the African ratio of exported intermediates over final goods equal to 6.35 before
the allocation, becomes equal to 5.52 after the allocation which means that African final
goods exports are relatively higher after the repartition. It is worth to note that the
reliability of trade flows reported in the UN COMTRADE database, or in Francois and
Pindyuk (2013) is not the same for every country. For instance, imports reported by
Ghana from the USA could be significantly different than the exports reported by the
USA to Ghana. To ensure that the database that we get be consistent, we need to
take this into account. We do so by calculating a reliability index following Tsigas et al.
(2012). We use this index as a weight in the objective function of a quadratic optimization
problem that will help us obtain a consistent database21. The reliability index is obtained
as follows:
RIXi =
XAi∑
j Xij
where XAi =
∑
j∈Aij≤0.25
Xij and Aij =
|Mji −Xij|
Xij
(46)
We then solve the following optimization problem:
V IFM Ij =
∑
i
V IMSij
V XMDij
∗ V XMDIij (47)
V IPMj + V IGMj + V IFM
CGDS
j =
∑
i
V IMSij
V XMDij
∗ V XMDFij (48)
V IFM Ij =
∑
i V XMD
I
ij + Sintj ∗ [(XTREVij +MFAREVij + TARIFREVij) + SV ST i ∗ (V TWRj)] (49)
V XMDij = V XMD
F
ij + V XMD
I
ij (50)
TV OMj = V DFM
I
j +
∑
i
V IMSij
V XMDij
∗ V XMDIij + V DPMj + V DGMj + V IGMj + V IPMj
+V DFMCGDSj + V IFM
CGDS
j + V STj +
∑
i 6=j
V XMDji − V IMSij
(51)
TV OMi = V DFM
I
i + V DPMi + V DGMi + V DFM
CGDS
i + V STi +
∑
j V XMD
I
ij +
∑
j V XMD
F
ij (52)
21Some countries such as Taiwan or Puerto Rico are included in the GTAP database, but not in
the COMTRADE database. For these, we use a proportionality method to obtain the initial share of
intermediate and final goods. We attribute a zero level of reliability to the obtained flows so that our
objective function gives less weight to these data in the optimization process.
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MIN (OMEGA) = 1
2
{∑
i
∑
j
(
(V XMDIij−V XMDIij)
2
RIXi
−1
)
+
∑
i
∑
j
(V XMDFij−V XMDFij)
2
RIXi
−1
}
(53)
Where V XMDIij and V XMD
F
ij are initial data obtained from the first breakdown of trade
flows between intermediate and final goods respectively and
V IMSij
V XMDij
the ratio between
imports inclusive of import duties/transport services and imports at their FOB price.
OMEGA is a quadratic objective penalty function that gives more weight to data from
reliable exporters, and therefore adjusts more data from unreliable exporters. To preview
the results, the correlation between initial and optimized intermediate goods flows is
equal to 0.87, while it is equal to 0.92 for final goods. As regards African countries, this
correlation is equal to 0.87 for intermediate goods flows, and 0.69 for final goods. More
detailed results are presented in table 9.
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Table 9: Correlation between collected and optimized data (Author’s calculations)
Exporter Name
Correlation
intermediate
goods
Correlation
final goods
Reliability
index
ALB Albania 0,80 0,50 0,57
ARE
United Arab
Emirates
0,00 -0,01 0,00
ARG Argentina 0,98 0,98 0,78
ARM Armenia 0,70 0,77 0,47
AUS Australia 0,99 0,87 0,72
AUT Austria 0,99 0,99 0,72
AZE Azerbaijan 0,88 0,74 0,69
BEL Belgium 0,95 0,96 0,39
BEN Benin 0,57 0,80 0,21
BFA Burkina Faso 0,95 0,18 0,01
BGD Bangladesh 0,35 0,97 0,77
BGR Bulgaria 0,95 0,91 0,55
BHR Bahrain 0,42 0,44 0,21
BLR Belarus 0,56 0,61 0,26
BOL Bolivia 0,72 0,21 0,55
BRA Brazil 0,98 0,96 0,67
BRN
Brunei
Darussalam
0,96 0,03 0,83
BWA Botswana 0,99 0,02 0,75
CAN Canada 1,00 1,00 0,81
CHE Switzerland 0,94 0,79 0,60
CHL Chile 0,98 0,86 0,63
CHN China 0,80 0,88 0,45
CIV Côte d’Ivoire 0,85 0,69 0,44
CMR Cameroon 0,63 0,74 0,39
COL Colombia 0,99 0,80 0,66
CRI Costa Rica 0,95 0,97 0,59
CYP Cyprus 0,87 0,89 0,44
CZE Czech Republic 0,99 0,98 0,50
DEU Germany 0,98 0,99 0,77
DNK Denmark 0,95 0,97 0,61
DOM
Dominican
Republic P
0,89 0,93 0,46
ECU Ecuador 0,99 0,72 0,73
EGY Egypt 0,85 0,85 0,46
ESP Spain 0,95 0,96 0,69
EST Estonia 0,93 0,93 0,34
ETH Ethiopia 0,85 0,83 0,49
FIN Finland 0,96 0,94 0,65
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
Exporter Name
Correlation
intermediate
goods
Correlation
final goods
Reliability
index
FRA France 0,98 0,99 0,74
GBR
United
Kingdom
0,96 0,97 0,63
GEO Georgia 0,72 0,43 0,39
GHA Ghana 0,34 0,50 0,14
GIN Guinea 0,45 -0,02 0,00
GRC Greece 0,72 0,80 0,64
GTM Guatemala 0,97 0,90 0,50
HKG Hong Kong 0,85 0,13 0,02
HND Honduras 0,88 0,96 0,61
HRV Croatia 0,88 0,82 0,61
HUN Hungary 0,99 0,98 0,69
IDN Indonesia 0,96 0,94 0,66
IND India 0,88 0,91 0,51
IRL Ireland 0,95 0,94 0,50
IRN Iran 0,79 0,47 0,24
ISR Israel 0,93 0,94 0,57
ITA Italy 0,99 0,98 0,71
JAM Jamaica 0,95 0,07 0,45
JOR Jordan 0,54 0,57 0,33
JPN Japan 0,95 0,98 0,73
KAZ Kazakhstan 0,91 0,60 0,30
KEN Kenya 0,09 0,34 0,00
KGZ Kyrgyztan 0,94 0,90 0,20
KHM Cambodia 0,04 0,86 0,44
KOR
Korea,
Republic of
0,97 0,98 0,62
KWT Kuwait 0,66 0,09 0,28
LAO Lao PDR 0,79 0,22 0,10
LKA Sri Lanka 0,76 0,75 0,64
LTU Lithuania 0,82 0,89 0,37
LUX Luxembourg 0,88 0,75 0,47
LVA Latvia 0,90 0,90 0,43
MAR Morocco 0,88 0,78 0,52
MDG Madagascar 0,71 0,18 0,37
MEX Mexico 1,00 1,00 0,86
MLT Malta 0,59 0,64 0,53
MNG Mongolia 0,30 -0,01 0,00
MOZ Mozambique 0,34 0,39 0,20
MUS Mauritius 0,65 0,63 0,54
MWI Malawi 0,82 0,22 0,17
49
Table 9 – continued from previous page
Exporter Name
Correlation
intermediate
goods
Correlation
final goods
Reliability
index
MYS Malaysia 0,94 0,92 0,56
NAM Namibia 0,70 0,49 0,44
NGA Nigeria 0,88 0,23 0,26
NIC Nicaragua 0,87 0,49 0,75
NLD Netherlands 0,99 0,99 0,54
NOR Norway 0,85 0,90 0,40
NPL Nepal 0,01 0,93 0,24
NZL New Zealand 0,94 0,96 0,75
OMN Oman 0,98 0,63 0,68
PAK Pakistan 0,77 0,96 0,60
PAN Panama 0,95 0,57 0,07
PER Peru 0,96 0,23 0,50
PHL Philippines 0,87 0,81 0,26
POL Poland 0,99 0,98 0,64
PRI Puerto Rico 0,03 0,00 0,00
PRT Portugal 0,96 0,97 0,67
PRY Paraguay 0,85 0,35 0,38
QAT Qatar 0,95 0,54 0,25
ROU Romania 0,98 0,97 0,66
RUS Russia 0,79 0,77 0,35
RWA Rwanda 0,37 -0,02 0,06
SAU Saudi Arabia 0,54 0,78 0,41
SEN Senegal 0,61 0,16 0,24
SGP Singapore 0,91 0,87 0,26
SLV El Salvador 0,78 0,98 0,73
SVK Slovakia 0,97 0,96 0,54
SVN Slovenia 0,97 0,89 0,59
SWE Sweden 0,97 0,98 0,69
TGO Togo 0,35 0,25 0,24
THA Thailand 0,93 0,96 0,64
TTO
Trinidad and
Tobago P
0,99 0,43 0,42
TUN Tunisia 0,95 0,97 0,61
TUR Turkey 0,93 0,98 0,59
TWN Taiwan 0,11 0,34 0,00
TZA Tanzania 0,75 0,72 0,10
UGA Uganda 0,47 0,08 0,20
UKR Ukraine 0,95 0,99 0,72
URY Uruguay 0,83 0,91 0,71
USA
United States
of America
0,96 0,96 0,65
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
Exporter Name
Correlation
intermediate
goods
Correlation
final goods
Reliability
index
VEN Venezuela 0,54 0,31 0,31
VNM Viet Nam 0,95 0,98 0,63
XAC
South Central
Africa
0,99 -0,02 0,93
XCA
Rest of Central
America
0,82 0,04 0,84
XCB Rest of Caribbean 0,89 -0,01 0,14
XCF
Rest of Central
Africa
0,78 0,00 0,02
XEA
Rest of East
Asia
0,61 0,19 0,07
XEC
Rest of Eastern
Africa
-0,01 0,03 0,28
XEE
Rest of Eastern
Europe
0,72 0,93 0,38
XEF
Rest of European
Free Trade
Association
0,68 0,70 0,50
XER Rest of Europe 0,73 0,66 0,63
XNA
Rest of North
America
0,11 0,84 0,90
XNF
Rest of North
Africa
0,87 0,05 0,73
XOC Rest of Oceania 0,91 0,13 0,71
XSA Rest of South Asia 0,01 0,63 0,10
XSC
Rest of South
African
Customs Union
0,06 -0,04 0,41
XSE
Rest of
Southeast Asia
0,96 0,80 0,47
XSM
Rest of South
America
0,78 0,29 0,28
XSU
Rest of Former
Soviet Union
0,19 -0,02 0,00
XWF
Rest of
Western Africa
0,31 0,17 0,05
XWS
Rest of
Western Asia
0,61 0,30 0,24
ZAF South Africa 0,93 0,79 0,60
ZMB Zambia 0,94 0,04 0,03
ZWE Zimbabwe 0,62 0,11 0,03
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
Exporter Name
Correlation
intermediate
goods
Correlation
final goods
Reliability
index
TOT TOTAL 0,87 0,92
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